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THE DEATH OF DISCRETION: PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTIONS AUTOMATICALLY ADMISSIBLE IN
CIVIL ACTIONS - Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
INTRODUCTION
Upon cross-examination, common law practice allowed counsel
to impeach an adverse witness "by proof of bias, mental incapac-
ity, contradiction, prior inconsistent statements, bad character in-
cluding convictions, and religious opinions or beliefs."1 This rule
was based upon the belief that the trier of fact should have availa-
ble all evidence which might be useful in determining whether a
witness is lying or telling the truth.2 This liberal impeachment
practice created a widespread concern that juries were convicting
innocent persons on the basis of past criminal records. 3 In an at-
tempt to mitigate the prejudice caused by admission of prior con-
victions, Congress enacted Rule 609.4
1. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 607[02], at 607-24
(1988) [hereinafter, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
2. Id.
3. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), advisory com-
mittee's note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 298 (1969).
4. As amended in 1987, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides in part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record dur-
ing cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defend-
ant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not ad-
missible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of
the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement im-
posed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more
than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the pro-
ponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of in-
tent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair oppor-
1
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Rule 609(a)(1) addresses the admission of prior felony convic-
tions. The language of this subsection requires that the trial court
weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect such evidence may
have upon the defendant.' Prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,7 the ef-
fect of this provision upon civil litigation was not clear.' The cir-
cuit courts disagreed with respect to a trial judge's discretion to
exclude prior convictions evidence in civil proceedings.9 In Green,
the Supreme Court resolved this dispute.' 0 The Court held that
Rule 609 requires the trial court to admit evidence of prior felony
convictions offered to impeach civil litigants. 1
This Note has four objectives. First, the Note examines the
facts presented to the Green Court. Second, the Note surveys Rule
609's history and the divergent pre-Green views regarding Rule
609's application in the civil arena. Third, the Note examines
Green's analysis and the Supreme Court's conclusion that Rule 609
forecloses any judicial discretion in admitting or excluding prior
convictions evidence. And, finally, the Note concludes that North
Carolina's Rule 609 should also be interpreted as requiring trial
judges to admit prior convictions evidence regardless of unfair
prejudice.
THE CASE
Paul Green instituted a products liability action against the
manufacturer of a large commercial dryer.'" Green alleged that the
machine's defective design or manufacture caused him to lose his
arm when he reached in to stop the dryer.' 3 Prior to trial, Green
tunity to contest the use of such evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 609.
5. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 609[01], at 609-50. As stated in
the Advisory Committee's note, Rule 609 was drafted using the federal definition
of felony, "subject to imprisonment in excess of one year," rather than trying to
encompass all of the states' felony offenses. FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory commit-
tee's note.
6. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
7. 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
8. Id. at 1982.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1993.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1983.
13. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
[Vol. 12:319
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filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his criminal rec-
ord.1 4 The judge denied the motion and ruled that Green's convic-
tions of criminal trespass, statutory rape, burglary and conspiracy
to commit burglary could be used to impeach Green's testimony.6
At trial, counsel for the defendant manufacturer questioned Green
regarding his prior convictions of burglary and conspiracy to com-
mit burglary. Green admitted he had previously been convicted
of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary. 7 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant manufacturer and Green ap-
pealed. 8 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
the district court.1 9 Green petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari.2 0 Green contended that he did not re-
ceive a fair trial because he was impeached by his prior felony con-
victions.21 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals and held that prior felony convictions are
automatically admissible to impeach witnesses in civil proceed-
ings.2" The Court declared that a trial judge must "permit im-
peachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convic-
tions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the
party offering the testimony."23
BACKGROUND
A. History of Impeachment by Prior Convictions
At common .law, the courts considered a person convicted of a
felony incompetent to testify as a witness. " This rule was later
14. Id.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
16. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1983.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
22. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1993.
23. Id.
24. 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 609[02], at 609-58; 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 519 (J. Chadburn rev. 1979).
The underlying rationale for this "disqualification arose as part of the pun-
ishment for the crime, only later being rationalized on the basis that such a per-
son was unworthy of belief." 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 609[02], at
609-58 (citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1940)).
1990]
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changed to allow convicted felons to testify.25 However, the courts
generally held that a witness's testimony could be impeached by
evidence of a prior felony conviction or evidence of a crimen falsi 26
misdemeanor conviction.
Luck v. United States28 provided the first significant depar-
ture from the rule that prior felony convictions are automatically
admissible.29 In Luck, the defendant appealed convictions of
housebreaking and larceny. 0 The defendant challenged the district
court's admission of a previous grand larceny conviction.3 1 At issue
in Luck was a District of Columbia statute which provided that
evidence of a witness's prior convictions "may be given in evidence
to affect his credit as a witness.... 32 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals interpreted this statute and held that admission
of the prior conviction was not required.
33
The Luck court stressed the fact that the statute provided
that priorconvictions evidence may (rather than shall) be admit-
ted. 4 The Luck court reasoned that Congress intended that the
trial judge exercise discretion in determining whether to admit or
exclude convictions evidence.35 Five years after Luck, Congress re-
25. Id.
26. Crimen falsi is generally described as being conduct which involves dis-
honesty. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 609[04], at 609-74 to -75.
The Courts have generally held that crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement include perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false
pretense, mail fraud, and forgery but do not include prostitution, assault and nar-
cotics convictions. The courts are not in agreement, however, whether "stealing-
type" offenses such as robbery, burglary, petit larceny and receiving stolen prop-
erty involve crimen falsi. See Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule
609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Permitting Impeachment of Witnesses
by Evidence of Prior Conviction of Crime, 39 A.L.R. FED. 570 (1978).
27. 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, T 609[04], at 609-74 to -75.
28. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
29. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 314, at 287 (1979)
[hereinafter LoUISELL & MUELLER].
30. Luck, 348 F.2d at 764.
31. Id.
32. The District of Columbia statute at issue in Luck provided: "No person
shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason
of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to
affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or
evidence aliunde. . . ." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1961).
33. Luck, 348 F.2d at 768.
34. Id.
35. Id.
[Vol. 12:319
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instated the prevailing view." In 1970, Congress amended the Dis-
trict of Columbia statute to provide that prior conviction evidence
"shall be admitted. 3 7
B. Enactment of Rule 609
In March, 1969, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure submitted its initial draft of the proposed rules of
evidence.3 8 The Advisory Committee's first draft of Rule 609 re-
jected Luck's discretionary standard. 9 The proposed draft pro-
vided that evidence of felony convictions and evidence of even mis-
demeanor convictions involving dishonesty or false statements
were admissible to attack the credibility of a witness."° Rule 609
was revised numerous times prior to the adoption of its final form
in 1975. The final form came as a compromise of the House bill
36. Congress amended the District of Columbia Statute to read as follows:
[F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if
offered.... but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of
punishment). [emphasis added].
Section 133(b) of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 551, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305(b) (1967, Supp.
IV 1971).
37. Id.
38. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), 46 F.R.D. 161
(1969).
39. Id. at 299.
40. The first draft provided, in part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit-
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but
only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), 46 F.R.D. 161, 295-96
(1969).
41. The Advisory Committee's second draft adopted the Luck approach by
allowing exclusion of evidence of prior felony convictions and crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement if the probative value was "substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice." Proposed Rules of Evidence (II), 51 F.R.D.
315, 391 (1971).
After the second draft met resistance, the Advisory Committee retreated to
its first draft. See Proposed Rules of Evidence (III), 56 F.R.D. 183, 269-70 (1973).
The House Judiciary Committee rejected the proposed rule and prepared a
draft which provided that only evidence of prior convictions involving dishonesty
5
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and the Senate bill.2 The House version provided for impeach-
ment only by crimen falsi convictions. 43 The Senate bill, on the
other hand, required admission of both felony and crimen falsi
convictions.""
C. Pre-Green Interpretations of Rule 609
As finally enacted, Rule 609 divides prior convictions into two
categories. 4 5 Rule 609(a)(1) provides for impeachment by felony
crimes 46 regardless of the nature of the crime. 47 Rule 609(a)(2)
deals with crimes involving dishonesty or false statement regard-
less of the punishment.4
or false statement would be admissible. See 120 CONG. REC. 2374 (1974).
Like the House Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee rec-
ommended that evidence of convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement be admissible to impeach a witness. The Senate Judiciary Committee's
version differed from the House Judiciary Committee's draft by allowing admis-
sion of non-dishonesty felony convictions where the court found that the proba-
tive value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect upon the party for
whom the witness was testifying. See 120 CONG. REC. 37076 (1974).
The full Senate rejected the Committee's recommendations and instead re-
tained the Advisory Committee's version which provided for automatic admissi-
bility of prior convictions. See 120 CONG. REc. 37076, 37083 (1974).
42. See 120 CONG. REC. 40894 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis) ("[I]n confer-
ence, we came up with a compromise .... It is the best we thought we could
do . . .").
43. The House bill provided: "(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is
admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement." 120 CONG.
REC. 2374 (1974).
44. The Senate bill provided:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit-
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examina-
tion but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of 1 year under the law under which he was convicted or (2)
invIved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
120 CONG. REc. 37076 (1974).
45. 2 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA § 43.3, at 6 (1987)
[hereinafter JOSEPH & SALTZBURG].
46. As stated in the Advisory Committee's note, Rule 609 was drafted using
the federal definition of felony, "subject to imprisonment in excess of one year,"
rather than trying to encompass all of the states' felony offenses. FED. R. EVID.
609 advisory committee's note.
47. 2 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 45 § 43.3, at 6.
48. Id.
[Vol. 12:319
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1. Admissibility of Crimen Falsi Convictions
.The courts generally interpret Rule 609(a)(2) as requiring ad-
mission of evidence of crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment in order to impeach a witness's testimony.49 Historically,
prior convictions evidence has been admitted in order to demon-
strate a witness's willingness to lie.50 Rule 609(a)(2) follows the
traditional belief that evidence that a witness lied in the past is
evidence that the witness may lie again. 1
2. Admissibility of Felony Convictions
The admissibility of prior felony convictions not involving dis-
honesty or false statement has created confusion among the
courts.2 Rule 609(a)(1) sets forth a restriction (commonly referred
to as the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test) which has created great
controversy.5 Rule 609(a)(1) provides that evidence of prior felony
convictions may be excluded if the probative value of the evidence
"outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." [Emphasis
added] ."
a. Application of Rule 609(a) (1) to Criminal Trials
With respect to criminal trials, the circuit courts have gener-
ally held that evidence of prior felony convictions is automatically
admissible to impeach the testimony of the prosecution's wit-
49. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 609[041, at 609-74 to -75; 3 Loui-
SELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 317, at 332-33; See e.g., United States v. Wong,
703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983); United States v. Kiendra,
663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.
1976).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do provide restrictions upon the admissibility
of prior convictions evidence. Note that Federal Rule of Evidence 609 allows evi-
dence of prior convictions to be admitted only for the purpose of determining the
witness's credibility. FED. R. EVID. 609. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of
prior crimes is not admissible to show a course of conduct. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
Also, Rule 609(b) provides restrictions upon the admissibility of convictions older
than ten years. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
50. See 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, T 609[02], at 609-59; Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), advisory committee's note, 46
F.R.D. 161, 298 (1969).
51. Id.
52. See cases cited infra notes 67-71.
53. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) cited supra note 4.
54. Id.
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nesses.55 But, when the prosecution intends to use prior felony con-
victions to impeach the defendant or the defendant's witness, Rule
609(a)(1)'s balancing provision applies.6 The court is then re-
quired to weigh the probative value of the conviction evidence
against the prejudicial effect the prior convictions may have upon
the defendant." If the court determines that the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect, then the court must admit the
evidence."
b. Application of Rule 609(a)(1) to Civil Proceedings
Prior to Green, the effect of Rule 609 upon civil trials was not
as clear.6 9 A strict interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1) requires the
court to conduct a balancing of prejudice and probative value in
order to determine whether to admit or exclude a civil defendant's
prior felony convictions.6 Yet, the plain meaning of Rule 609 di-
rects that the court admit evidence of a civil plaintiff's prior felony
convictions regardless of prejudice.6
The courts agree that such a strict application of the rule
would be unfair to plaintiffs.2 However, prior to the Supreme
55. United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (district court erred
in excluding evidence of government informant's previous forgery convictions); 3
LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 316, at 325.
56. 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 316, at 325.
57. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968), set forth the factors to be considered in exercising discretion to
admit or exclude prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching a defend-
ant witness. These factors are as follows:
(1) "nature of the crime";
(2) "time of conviction and witness' subsequent history";
(3) "similarity between past crime and charged crime";
(4) "importance of defendant's testimony"; and
(5) "centrality of the credibility issue."
3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 609[03], at 609-66 to -72 (1988) (citing
Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940-41; See also 3 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, §
315, at 227-32.
Note, however, that the balancing of prejudice and probative value is not re-
quired if the prior conviction may also be classified as a crimen falsi conviction
which is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 3 LoUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 29 § 316, at 324-25.
58. 3 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 316, at 324-25.
59. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
60. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
61. Id.
62. Id. (denying a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adverse witness
[Vol. 12:319
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Court's decision in Green, the courts disagreed on how to avoid
this unfairness.6 3
c. The Interplay of Rule 403
Two questions have created a controversy among the circuit
courts."' First, the courts do not agree whether the Rule 609(a)(1)
balancing test applies in civil as well as criminal cases.6 5 Second,
the courts dispute whether the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test pre-
empts the balancing provision contained in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403.6
The views enunciated by the courts prior to Green may gener-
ally be categorized into four different positions: 7
as is granted a civil defendant might amount to a violation of the plaintiff's due
process rights); Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (a literal
reading of the rule "would load the dice in favor of defendants in civil
cases . . . ").
63. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
64. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
65. Compare Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rule 609(a)(1)
balancing test applies in civil cases) with Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191 (6th
Cir. 1988) ("Rule 609(a)(1) was never intended to deal with the case of impeach-
ment of a plaintiff in a civil case . . .").
66. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Both Rules 609 and 403 contain provisions requiring the court to balance the
prejudice and probative value of evidence in certain cases. The subtle distinctions
in the rules' language presents some cases where the question of which balancing
test applies may be critical. This question may be important for two reasons.
Generally, evidence may be more easily excluded under Rule 609 than under
Rule 403. Rule 403's language tends to favor admission of the evidence because
evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is "substantially outweighed"
by its prejudicial effect. Rule 609's balancing test favors exclusion of prior convic-
tions evidence because such evidence may only be admitted if its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Futhermore, the burden of persuasion differs under Rules 403 and 609. Rule
403 places the burden of persuasion upon the party seeking exclusion of the evi-
dence. Rule 609 places the burden upon the party seeking to impeach a witness.
See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987).
67. Although seemingly complex, the positions differ due to the courts' differ-
ing treatment of two factors: (1) the party for whom the witness testifies; and (2)
the type of proceeding (i.e., whether a civil or criminal proceeding).
1990]
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(1)When a witness testifies for a civil or criminal defendant,
the Rule 609 balancing test applies. When a witness testifies for a
civil plaintiff, the Rule 403 balancing provision applies.8
(2)When any witness testifies in a civil or criminal proceed-
ing, the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test applies. Rule 403 does not
apply. 9
(3)When any witness testifies in a civil proceeding, the Rule
403 balancing provision applies.7 0
(4)When a witness testifies on behalf of a criminal defendant,
the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test applies. When the witness testi-
fies on behalf of a civil plaintiff, civil defendant or the prosecu-
tion, the evidence is automatically admissible.'
ANALYSIS
In the Green decision, Justice Stevens acknowledged that a
number of courts and commentators have greatly criticized the
practice of automatically admitting prior convictions evidence to
impeach witnesses. 72 However, the Court realized that its task was
68. See Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1987) (court reserved for
later determination whether Rule 403 applied to civil defendants); Wierstak v.
Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986) (Rule 403 applicable to exclude evidence
of civil plaintiff's prior felony convictions); Accord Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d
1191 (6th Cir. 1988).
69. See Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding Rule 609(a)(1)
balancing test applies to civil litigants); Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 725
F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1984) (without analyzing the applicability of Rule 609(a)(1),
the court determined that the district court properly excluded evidence of plain-
tiff's prior felony convictions under Rule 609(a)(1)).
70. Courts following this view totally ignore the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test
since evidence is more easily excluded under the Rule 403 balancing test. See
Jones v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs., 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 2434 (1989) (court declined to decide whether Rule 609 applied to civil
cases stating, "[aissuming arguendo that the Rule does apply - and we are not
convinced that it does... evidence of prior convictions admissible under Rule 609
without any balancing test could be excluded under the balancing test of Rule
403." [Emphasis supplied]); Shows v. MN Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.
1983) (court implied that Rule 403 balancing test might be applied in criminal
cases; the fifth circuit appears to have since changed its course by applying the
Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test. See, e.g., Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir.
1985)).
71. Under this view, which was adopted by the Green court, evidence of prior
felony convictions is automatically admissible in civil actions. See Campbell v.
Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985);
72. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
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not to "fashion the rule" to produce the most desirable result, but
"to identify the rule that Congress fashioned. 7 3 The Court re-
jected an interpretation based upon the rule's strict language. 4
The Court stated that such an interpretation may amount to a vio-
lation of a plaintiff's due process rights.75 Furthermore, the Court
determined that granting a civil defendant greater rights than a
civil plaintiff would be an unsound practice.7 6 A civil party's status
as plaintiff or defendant is often based merely upon who filed the
action or upon the nature of the cause of action.7 The Court found
Rule 609's language ambiguous with respect to admissibility of
prior convictions in civil cases.78 Then, the Court proceeded to de-
termine whether Congress intended Rule 609 to apply to civil
cases.
7 9
A. Rule 609(a)(1) Balancing in Civil Actions
The Court began its analysis by considering whether Congress
intended the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test to apply to civil liti-
gants.60 After a complete examination of Rule 609's history, the
Court determined that Congress did not intend the Rule 609(a)(1)
balancing test to apply to civil litigants.8 1 The Court based its con-
clusion upon three findings.82 First, the Court noted that prior to
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts generally
admitted prior convictions to impeach a witness's testimony.8 Fur-
thermore, the congressional debates involving Rule 609 centered
around the prejudicial impact upon criminal defendants .8 There-
fore, the Court concluded that it should not assume "that Congress
intended silently to overhaul the law of impeachment in the civil
context." 85
Second, the Court determined that the proposed drafts of
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1985.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1984.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1984-92.
81. Id. at 1992.
82. Id. at 1988-92.
83. Id. at 1988.
84. Id. at 1991.
85. Id.
1990] 329
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Rule 609 distinguished civil and criminal cases only to "mitigate
prejudice to criminal defendants. '86 The Conference Committee
considered and rejected the fact that such evidence might prejudi-
cially affect a witness "other than the accused."87 The Conference
Committee declared that any prejudicial effect prior convictions
evidence might have upon a witness other than the accused was
"so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment."88
Finally, the Court stated that if the Conference Committee
had intended to protect parties or witnesses other than a criminal
defendant, the Conference Committee could have easily done so. 9
As noted by the Court, the Conference Committee had access to all
of the proposed drafts of Rule 609.90 In fact, the House Subcom-
mittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee possessed both of the
proposed drafts which protected civil litigants. 1 Congress rejected
both proposed drafts.2 The Court concluded that Rule 609(a)(1)'s
balancing test does not apply to civil cases. 3
B. Pre-emption of Rule 403
The Court then turned to the second issue - whether, in civil
cases, the courts may still exclude evidence of prior felony convic-
tions under Rule 403.94 In deciding this question, the Court pri-
marily relied on principles of statutory construction. 5 The Court
determined that Congress intended Rule 609 to be the exclusive
means of excluding prior convictions evidence." The Court noted
that Rule 609 is a rule which deals specifically with impeachment
of witnesses. 7 Rule 403, on the other hand, is a general rule which
excludes evidence when its prejudicial effect substantially out-
weighs its probative value.98 According to cardinal principles of
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Proposed Rules of Evidence (II), Rule 609 advisory commit-
tee's note, 51 F.R.D. at 392).
88, Id.
89..d. at 1991.
90, Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93, Id. at 1992.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1992-93.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1992.
98. Id.
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statutory construction, a specific rule overrides a more general
rule.99 Therefore, the Court reasoned that Rule 609 overrides Rule
403.100
The Court also emphasized Rule 609's language - that evi-
dence of prior convictions "shall be admitted."10 1 This phraseology
also appears in Rule 609(a)(2). 0 2 Applying Rule 609(a)(2), the cir-
cuit courts agree that the courts must admit crimen falsi convic-
tion evidence.103 According to general rules of construction, lan-
guage used multiple times in a statute should be interpreted in the
same manner throughout the statute.10 4 Thus, the Court concluded
that Rule 609(a)(1) also bars the exercise of discretion in admitting
prior felony convictions.10 5
The Court recognized that other subsections and subparts of
Rule 609 contain balancing provisions.10 6 The balancing provisions
contained in these subsections exclude the application of Rule 403
in both civil and criminal cases. 10 7 The Court determined that Rule
403 should not be invoked to modify only one of numerous subsec-
tions of a rule.10 8 Furthermore, the Court stressed the fact that
earlier drafts of Rule 609 provided a balancing of probative value
and prejudicial effect in civil cases. 0 9 If Congress had intended for
Rule 403 to apply, Congress would not have so readily rejected the
earlier drafts.110
C. Inherent Problems with Impeachment by Convictions
1. Parties Prejudiced by Convictions
Automatically admitting prior felony convictions may very
well prejudice a civil litigant.1 ' Two major problems may arise
when a witness's testimony is impeached by prior felony convic-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1993.
102. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
103. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1993.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 315, at 316-18; 2 JOSEPH &
SALTZBURG, supra note 45, § 43.3, at 8.
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tions. 2 First, the jury may misuse the evidence.11 3 Juries may give
the evidence undue weight or may use the evidence for an im-
proper purpose, such as determining a witness's character.' The
prejudice is particularly severe when the testifying witness is a
party to a civil action or a criminal defendant.1 1 5
For example, Green involved a civil plaintiff who had previ-
ously been convicted of rape, burglary, conspiracy to commit bur-
glary and criminal trespass."' Green sued the defendant manufac-
turer for injuries sustained when Green's arm was amputated by
the manufacturer's allegedly defective machine. 7
The manufacturer claimed that Green had assumed the risk of
injury.118 The manufacturer produced witnesses who testified that
they had instructed Green not to place his arms in the machine
until the machine stopped." 9 Green denied these instructions.
2 0
Because of the conflicting testimony presented, the case did con-
tain a credibility issue.1 2' However, the fact remains that the jury
may have decided that Green is a bad person and, as such, should
not recover for his injuries.
In Green, the potential for misuse of the conviction evidence
appears to outweigh the probability that the jury actually used the
evidence to determine Green's credibility. Furthermore, assuming
that the jury did not misuse the evidence, the likelihood that the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Furthermore, some authorities have suggested that juries do not follow
the courts' instructions that evidence of a witness's prior convictions may only be
used for purposes of assessing the witness's credibility. 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 29, § 315, at 316-18 (citing Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take
the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 215, 218 (1968).
115. 2 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 45, § 43.3, at 8 ("informing the jury
in a rape case that defendant has a prior rape conviction and then instructing the
jurors that this evidence can only be used to evaluate credibility is to recommend
'a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their power, but anybody else.'"
(quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 556 (1932))).
116. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
117. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1983.
118. Brief for Respondent at 3, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
119. Id. at 3-4.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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jury was aided by evidence of Green's prior convictions seems
negligible.
2. Parties Deterred from Testifying
A practice of automatically admitting prior convictions may
deter parties from testifying.122 Disclosure of a past criminal record
may embarass the testifying party. 123 Also, the party faces the risk
that prior convictions may unduly prejudice the jury against
him. 2 4 The party may wish to escape these risks by avoiding the
witness stand. 2 5 Yet, the alternative, not testifying, presents the
other. side of a double-edged sword. A jury may interpret the
party's failure to testify as meaning that the party is hiding some-
thing.12 6 Greater prejudice may result from suspicion than from
disclosure.
1 27
.D. A Second Look at Green
Notwithstanding the problems of impeachment by prior felony
convictions, the Green Court correctly concluded that Rule
609(a)(1) requires that evidence of prior felonies be admitted in
civil actions regardless of prejudice. As stated in Green, the Su-
preme Court's task was not to redraft Rule 609 to reach an equita-
ble or just result. 12s The Court's role was merely to construe the
122. See 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29 § 315, at 317.
123. Id.
124. During a Senate Judiciary debate, Senator Hart argued:
The man with a prior criminal record in this country is far more at
the mercy of the authorities-police and judicial-than seems to me war-
ranted .... [I]f he is arrested and put on trial, he has two almost hope-
less alternatives .... He can take the stand and deny his participation in
the crime now charged ... in which case he is very likely to be convicted.
Or he can refuse to take the stand ... in which case he is also very likely
to be convicted ..
3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29 § 314, at 301 (quoting 120 CONG. REC.
37078-37079 (1974) (quoting Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021
(1965))).
125. 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 315, at 317.
126. Id. (citing Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The
Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
215, 221-22 for the proposition that "juries more frequently convict those who do
not testify than those who do").
127. Id.
128. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
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rule as Congress intended. 1 9
The Advisory Committee which promulgated Rule 609 found
that "[a] demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in con-
duct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willing-
ness to give false testimony. ' 130 This finding served as the basis for
Rule 609.131 However erroneous this belief, Rule 609 is supported
by a rational belief which must be given deference by the courts.
Amending Rule 609 to grant the courts discretion to exclude prior
felony convictions in civil actions is a matter for the joint effort of
Congress and the Supreme Court.132 The Supreme Court should
not attempt such an amendment through an exaggerated interpre-
tation of the rule.
Furthermore, Rule 609's balancing provision differs only
slightly from the balancing provision contained in Rule 403.1"'
Rule 609(a)(1) allows admission of prior convictions evidence when
the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect.134 Rule 403 allows the court to exclude evidence when
129. Id.
130. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), 46 F.R.D. 161, 297
(1969). This belief is further demonstrated by Representative Hogan's statements
during the Conference Committee debates:
Should a witness with an antisocial background be allowed to stand
on the same basis of believability before juries as law-abiding citizens
with unblemished records? I think not.
Personally I am more concerned about the moral worth of individu-
als capable of engaging in such outrageous acts as adversely reflecting on
a witness' character than I am of thieves....
Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1991 n.27 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 2376 (1974) (remarks of
Rep. Hogan)).
131. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence (I), 46 F.R.D. 161, 297
(1969).
132. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 authorize the Supreme Court to "prescribe ...
rules of evidence . subject to congressional approval. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74
(1988). With respect to most evidence rules, congressional inaction constitutes ap-
proval. See 28 U.S.C. § 2076 commentary on repeal (1988).
133. Smith, Impeaching the Merits: Rule 609(a)(1) and Civil Plaintiffs, 13
N. Ky. L. REV. 441, 460 n.197 (1987) [hereinafter, Smith]. As noted supra note 66,
the subtle distinctions in the language of Rule 609(a)(1) and Rule 403 present
some cases where the question of which balancing provision applies may be criti-
cal. The argument that Rule 609's balancing provision differs only slightly from
the Rule 403 balancing provision does not disregard the distinctions in the rules'
language. Rather, this argument assumes that Congress focused upon the effect of
the balancing provisions on the majority of cases.
134. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
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the danger of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value.' 35 Arguably, Rule 609 may exclude evidence which is not ex-
cludable under Rule 403.136 Yet, this minor "difference [in the
rules] hardly merits the congressional agonizing over passage of
Rule 609(a)(1)."'1 37 Thus, Congress must have intended for prior
felony convictions to be automatically admissible in civil cases.
Another factor not discussed in Green may have affected the
court's decision. On August 15, 1988 the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure published a preliminary draft of
proposed amendments to Rule 609.111 The amendments, if
adopted, will provide (1) that Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test ap-
plies only when a criminal defendant testifies; and (2) that evi-
dence of all other witnesses' prior felony convictions may be ex-
cluded by the Rule 403 balancing of prejudice and probative
value.'39
Two facts suggest that Congress originally intended that prior
felony convictions be automatically admitted but has since consid-
ered that a case-by-case analysis might be more appropriate. First,
135. FED. R. EVID. 403.
136. Smith, supra note 133, at 460 n.197.
137. Id.
138. The proposed amended Rule 609(a) reads as follows:
(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than a criminal defendant has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that a criminal
defendant has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant; and
(2) evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE,
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY, AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 109 S. Ct. 220, 256 (1988).
On January 26, 1990, the United States Supreme Court adopted amendments
to Rule 609(a) which are virtually identical to the proposed amendments set forth
supra. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence - Rule 609, 110 S. Ct.
(CXXVIII, CXXX (1990). However, Congress may change or decline to approve
these amendments at any time prior to December 1, 1990.
139. Id.
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the proposed amendments are, in effect, reiterations of previously
rejected drafts of Rule 609.140 Second, the proposed amendments
do not merely clarify the existing rule. Under the present Rule 609,
a trial court must determine whether evidence of a criminal wit-
ness's prior convictions is prejudicial to the defendant.' The pro-
posed amendments, on the other hand, require that the courts con-
duct a Rule 403 balancing when the prosecution attempts to
impeach a criminal witness (other than the defendant).142
Rule 403 does not restrict the courts to an examination of
prejudice to the defendant. 143 Under Rule 403, a court may exclude
evidence for other reasons including prejudice to the witness. "4
The Conference Committee expressly rejected a proposed rule be-
cause it allowed the court to consider prejudice to a nondefendant
witness.14 5 Obviously, then, the proposed amendments constitute a
new procedural practice and not merely technical changes in the
rule.
IMPACT ON NORTH CAROLINA
A. Background of North Carolina's Rule 609
In 1983, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence.14 6 Although the federal rule
served as the model for North Carolina's Rule 609, the North Car-
olina rule differs substantially from its federal counterpart. 4 7 The
140. The recently proposed amendments require some type of balance of
probative value and prejudicial effect in all cases, regardless of the nature of the
crime and regardless of the party testifying. With the exception that the proposed
amendments favor exclusion of a criminal defendant's prior convictions, the newly
proposed amendments are, in effect, a reiteration of the Advisory Committee's
second draft which allowed evidence of prior convictions unless the probative
value of such evidence was "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." See Proposed Rules of Evidence (II), 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971).
141. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
142. See supra note 138.
143. See supra note 66.
144. Id.
145. See Proposed Rules of Evidence (II), advisory committee's note, 51
F.R.D. 315, 392 (1971) (stating that any prejudice which prior convictions evi-
dence might have on a witness other than the accused is "so minimal as scarcely
to be a subject of comment").
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-i (1983).
147. North Carolina's Rule 609 provides, in part: "(a) General rule. For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime punishable by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted
[Vol. 12:319
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North Carolina General Assembly deleted the controversial Rule
609(a)(1) balancing provision contained in the federal rule.148 Yet,
the effect that such deletion may have upon the admissibility of
prior felony convictions remains unclear even after the Green
decision.
B. Ambiguity in North Carolina's Rule 609
Although the North Carolina rule seems clear on its face, the
rule is subject to two different interpretations. The North Carolina
courts might construe Rule 609 as requiring that the courts admit
evidence of prior convictions without regard to prejudice. Alterna-
tively, the courts could apply Rule 403 to exclude prejudicial prior
convictions. Pursuant to North Carolina's Rule 403, the courts may
exclude evidence otherwise admissible if the probative value of the
evidence is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice .... 'l However, Rule 403 is intended as a "guide for the
handling of situations for which no specific rules have been
formulated.' 50
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the question of whether Rule 609 pre-empts Rule 403.151
The Green court noted that this question arose during a House
Subcommittee hearing concerning an earlier draft of the federal
rule.152 During that hearing, Judge Friendly recognized that one
if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination or
thereafter. N.C.R. EvID. 609(a).
148. Id.
149. North Carolina's Rule 403 is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
See N.C.R. EVID. 403 commentary. Therefore, the federal interpretation of Rule
403 should serve as a guide in the interpretation of North Carolina's Rule 403.
See State v. Outlaw, 94 N.C. App. 491, 494, 380 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1989) (courts
should look to federal decisions for "enlightenment and guidance in ascertaining
the intent of the General Assembly in adopting these rules [of evidence]").
150. N.C.R. EVID. 403 commentary.
151. But see State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 401-02, 383 S.E.2d 911, 918
(1989) (stating in dictum, "[wihile Rule 609(a) is a rule of general admissibility,
Rule 609(d) . . . 'leaves admissibility in the trial court's discretion' "). Compare 3
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 314, at 158 (Supp. 1989) (stating that the
language of North Carolina's rule "suggests the possibility that the intent was to
foreclose the exercise of any such discretion") with Judge Friendly's testimony
before the House Subcommittee, infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
152. Green, 109 S. Ct. 1981 n.31 (1989), (citing Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 251-52 (1973)). Like
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could argue that Rule 403 does not apply.1 53 According to Judge
Friendly's analysis, Rule 403 is a rule of general application which
should only apply in the absence of a rule specifically dealing with
prior convictions. 1 5  Arguably, Rule 609 deals specifically with the
admission of prior convictions evidence and, therefore, Rule 609
should control.1 55 A contrary position argues that an evidence rule
is not specific in the absence of a specific provision for exclusion. 56
Therefore, where a rule such as North Carolina's Rule 609(a) does
not contain a specific provision for exclusion, Rule 403 may be uti-
lized to exclude evidence. 5 7
C. Resolving the Ambiguity
In order to resolve the ambiguity inherent in North Carolina's
North Carolina's rule, the draft considered during this debate did not contain a
balancing provision. Id.
153. During Judge Friendly's testimony before the House Subcommittee the
following discussion developed:
Judge FRIENDLY .... [O]f course, there is the overriding rule that
the judge can always exclude testimony where probative value he thinks
is outweighed by its prejudicial effect and perhaps in the case we are
discussing he should do that.
Mr. HUNGATE. Would that be true with or without the rules?
Judge FRIENDLY. That is true today.
Mr. HUNGATE. Would it remain true if these rules became
effective?
Judge FRIENDLY. I assume they have such a rule in here. I could
easily check.
Mr. DENNIS. It seems to me if he has to follow this rule he does not
have much discretion. Maybe he still could rule something out. I am not
sure.
Mr. HUNGATE. I believe section 403 is the rule to which you are
referring. ...
Judge FRIENDLY. I think . . . Congressman [Dennis'] point is a
good one. You have the problem: Does that apply when there is a specific
rule on the subject? This just says relevant evidence may [sic] excluded
if it has this effect. But then somebody is going to argue, this other rule
dealt very specifically with the question and rule 403 is out. I don't know
what the answer would be."
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See 120 CONG. REc. 2381 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Lott) (Rule 403 bal-
ancing provision applies where there is no specific provision for exclusion).
157. Id.
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rule, North Carolina courts should follow the Green Court's analy-
sis. The courts should examine the rule and North Carolina's pre-
rule practice in order to ascertain the General Assembly's intent.158
1. Analyzing the Language
According to Green, the language of North Carolina's Rule 609
tends to indicate that Rule 403 is not available to exclude evidence
of a witness's prior convictions. First, the language of North Caro-
lina's Rule 609(a) is mandatory - "evidence . . . shall be admit-
ted." 159 This language suggests that the General Assembly in-
tended to preclude any judicial inquiry into the probative value
and prejudicial effect of the evidence."
Second, the commentary to North Carolina's Rule 609 states
that "[tihe current practice in North Carolina is that any sort of
criminal offense may be the subject of inquiry for the purpose of
attacking credibility.' 161 This statement seems to mean that North
Carolina's practice requires that all convictions (regardless of the
nature of the crimes) offered to impeach a witness must be
admitted."2
Futhermore, like federal Rule 609, subparts (b) dealing with
old convictions and (d) dealing with juvenile adjudications contain
balancing provisions.'6 Since subpart (a) contains no balancing
provision, the courts might conclude that the General Assembly in-
tended to foreclose any judicial discretion in admitting prior
convictions.'64
158. After "[cloncluding that the text [of Rule 609] is ambiguous with re-
spect to civil cases," the Green court sought "guidance from legislative history
and from the rules' overall structure." Green, 109 S. Ct. 1984.
159. See 3 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 29, § 314, at 158 (Supp. 1989)
(analyzing North Carolina's Rule 609(a) and stating that the mandatory language
of Rule 609(a) - that "evidence . . . shall be admitted" - "suggests the possi-
bility that the intent was to foreclose the exercise of any such discretion").
160. Id.
161. N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary.
162. North Carolina's Rule 609 does not distinguish between felony convic-
tions and crimen falsi convictions. See N.C.R. EvID. 609(a) cited supra note 147.
163. North Carolina's Rule 609(b) provides in part: "Evidence of a conviction
under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has
elapsed . . . unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction . . . substantially outweighs its prejudicial ef-
fect .... [Emphasis added]." N.C.R. EVID. 609(b).
164. See Green, 109 S.Ct. at 1993.
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2. Examining the Pre-Rule Practice
An examination of North Carolina's impeachment practice
prior to the enactment of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
also suggests that the General Assembly intended that evidence of
convictions should be admitted irrespective of Rule 403. Prior to
North Carolina's Rule 609, counsel could always inquire into a wit-
ness's prior convictions. 6 5 If the witness admitted the convictions,
then this evidence was admitted for the purpose of determining
the witness's credibility.166 If, however, the witness denied the con-
viction, the general rule provided that counsel could not contradict
the witness's denial by proving the conviction with extrinsic evi-
dence. 7 As commonly noted, this restriction was often circum-
vented so that prior convictions evidence could almost always be
admitted.1 68
North Carolina's Rule 609 changed the prior practice in sev-
eral respects. 69 First, Rule 609(a) no longer restricts counsel to
proving a witness's prior convictions by eliciting an admission from
the witness.17 ° Counsel may now establish a witness's prior convic-
tions by introducing the record of his conviction.1 71 Second, the
rule has restricted the admissibility of prior convictions in North
Carolina. Only convictions punishable by more than sixty days'
confinement are admissible for impeachment purposes. 171 Subpart
(b) also changes North Carolina's pre-rule practice by limiting the
admissibility of prior convictions more than ten years old. 73 Fur-
165. See N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary; see also 1 H. BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS
ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 112, at 482-85 (1988) [hereinafter BRANDIS].
166. See 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165 § 112, at 482-85.
167. Under the pre-rule practice, a witness's denial could not be contradicted
"by introducing the record of his conviction or otherwise proving by other wit-
nesses that he was, in fact, convicted." N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary; 1 BRANDIS,
supra note 165, § 112, at 483 n.43.
168. For a collection of cases showing how the rule has been circumvented
see 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165; § 112, at 483 n.43.
169. See N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary; 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165, § 112, at
484-88.
170. N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary.
171. Id. See also 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165, § 112, at 483 n.43.
172. N.C.R. EvID. 609 commentary; 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165, § 112, at 484-
85.
173. Id. Rule 609(b) does not prohibit the admission of convictions more
than ten years old. Like its federal counterpart, North Carolina's Rule 609(b) al-
lows admission only if the court determines that the probative value of the con-
viction outweighs its prejudicial effect.
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thermore, Rule 609(c) prohibits the admission of pardoned
convictions.174
Rule 609 does not clearly establish, however, whether the Gen-
eral Assembly intended to overhaul the pre-rule practice of admit-
ting prior convictions without regard to unfair prejudice. As stated
by the Green Court, in the absence of a clear directive, the courts
should not interpret a rule in a manner which will overhaul the
prior practice.'7 5 This principle seems especially appropriate with
respect to the courts' interpretation of North Carolina's Rule 609.
The General Assembly did not merely fail to establish a new prac-
tice overhauling the prior practice. The General Assembly went
one step further when it affirmatively rejected a change in practice
suggested by the federal rules. Because the General Assembly re-
jected the federal balancing provision without providing for the ex-
clusion of prior convictions, the North Carolina courts should in-
terpret North Carolina's Rule 609 in accord with the pre-rule
practice by admitting prior convictions irrespective of Rule 403.
CONCLUSION
Green's direct impact upon federal civil trials is quite clear.
Under Federal Rule 609(a), a federal judge possesses no discretion
to exclude evidence of prior convictions offered .to impeach. civil
witnesses. However, the Green decision leaves several unanswered
questions.
Attorneys should consider Green's impact upon the other fed-
eral rules of evidence. In Green, the Supreme Court decided that
Rule 609 is a specific provision which overrides Rule 403. Did the
Court-determine that Rule 609 is specific merely because it deals
with impeachment by prior convictions? Or, is Rule 609(a) specific
because of the balancing provision contained in Rule 609(a)(1)?
If Green's decision was based upon the specific balancing pro-
vision contained in Rule 609(a)(1), then Rule 403 may apply to
other evidence rules which do not contain balancing provisions
(e.g., Rule 704 dealing with testimony of expert witnesses). Addi-
tionally, Rule 403 may exclude evidence admissible under rules
which do not contain balancing provisions in all subparts of the
rules (e.g., Rule 608 dealing with impeachment by character or
conduct).
Furthermore, Green's impact upon the interpretation of North
174. N.C.R. EVID. 609 commentary; 1 BRANDIS, supra note 165, § 112, at 485.
175. Green, 109 S.Ct. at 1991.
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Carolina's Rule 609 is unclear. North Carolina's Rule 609 is an
amended version of the federal rule. Because North Carolina's
Rule 609 does not contain the federal balancing provision, the
North Carolina courts need not decide whether civil litigants
should be treated differently from criminal defendants. However,
the courts will, inevitably, be forced to decide whether North Caro-
lina's Rule 403 may still be used to exclude prior convictions evi-
dence. In addressing this question, the courts should analyze the
rule's language and, more importantly, North Carolina's pre-rule
history regarding impeachment by prior convictions. If the courts
analyze the rule in this manner, the courts should conclude that
North Carolina's Rule 609, like its federal counterpart, requires the
courts to admit prior convictions irrespective of Rule 403.
Kimberly Swank Smith
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